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ADAKAH JURUAUDIT LUAR MEMAINKAN PERANAN DALAM PENTADBIRAN
KORPORAT? BUKTI DARI MALAYSIA.
ABSTRAK
Tumpuan pemilikan korporat telah mencipta konflik agensi antara pemilik-pemilik pengawalan
dan pemegang saham minoriti di Malaysia. Mekanisme kawalan korporat yang konvensional
adalah lazimnya lemah dalam mengatasi masalah agensi ini. Kajian ini memeriksa sama ada
juruaudit luar di Malaysia memainkan peranan dalam pentadbiran korporat dalam mengurangkan
masalah agensi antara pemilik pengawalan dan pemegang saham minoriti. Dengan menggunakan
sampel syarikat daripada Papan Utama dan Kedua pada tahun kewangan 2007, analisis
menunjukkan bahawa firma Malaysia yang mempunyai tumpuan pemilikan yang tinggi
berkemungkinan besar mengupah jenama nama, kualiti juruaudit. Dalam analisis yuran audit, kita
dapati bahawa di Malaysia, pasaran yuran audit adalah tertakluk kepada peraturan yang telah
ditetapkan. Ia menunjukkan bahawa juruaudit luar mempertimbangkan kerumitan pelangganya
dalam penentuan yuran audit. Juga, kita dapati bahawa juruaudit luar akan mempertimbangkan
tumpuan pemilikan dan keuntungan dalam pelangganya dalam keputusan laporan audit. Selaras
dengan analisis pendapat, kita dapati bahawa juruaudit akan mengelak dari hubungan audit yang
lama dengan syarikat-syarikat yang mempunyai masalah agensi dan masalah kewangan.
Keseluruhannya, kajian menyokong bahawa juruaudit luar memainkan peranan pentadbiran
korporat dalam mengurangkan konflik agensi di Malaysia.
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DO EXTERNAL AUDITORS PLAY A CORPORATE GOVERNANCE ROLE?
EVIDENCE FROM MALAYSIA.
ABSTRACT
Concentration of corporate ownership has created agency conflicts between controlling owners
and minority shareholders especially in emerging markets like Malaysia. Conventional corporate
control mechanisms are typically weak in containing this agency problem. This study examines
whether external independent auditors in Malaysia serve a corporate governance bonding
mechanism role to alleviate the agency problems between the controlling owner and minority
shareholders which is proxy by the ownership structure of the company. Using a broad sample of
Main Board and Second Board Public Listed Companies in Malaysia for the financial year 2007,
we found that Malaysian firms subject to greater agency problem indicated by their high
ownership concentration, are more likely to hire name brand, quality differentiated Big Four
external auditors. In the analysis of audit fees, we find that the audit market in Malaysia is subject
to fee regulations and that external auditors take into considerations of the complexity of its
clients when making audit fee decisions. Also, we find that external auditors lower the
modification threshold as their clients’ agency problem increases. Consistent with the opinion
analysis, it is noted that low earnings will more likely trigger auditors to avoid long audit tenure
with firms that have more agency problems embedded in their ownership structures. Taken
together overall evidence lends support to the agency theory and suggests that independent
external auditors do play a corporate governance role to mitigate agency conflict in emerging
market like Malaysia.
1Chapter 1
INTRODUCTION
1.1 Introduction
This chapter introduces the research outline of this study. The chapter illustrates the background,
problem statement, research objectives, research questions, significance of the study and major
variables of study.
1.2 Background of the Study
According to Accountant’s Today, a spate of mini-Enrons has been hitting Malaysia lately,
putting key players in the local corporate governance such as directors, managers, accountants,
auditors, corporate advisors, Bursa Malaysia, the Securities Commission (SC), and even analysts
and business journalists under the microscope. (Abdullah, 2007). The spate of mini- Enrons
mentioned above are referring to Megan Media Holdings Berhad, state-controlled lender
Bumiputra-Commerce Holdings Bhd, small technology firm Wimems Corp Bhd, and the more
prominent case Transmile Group.
The biggest financial irregularities were revealed in the Bursa Malaysia listed air cargo carrier,
Transmile Group. According to Accountant’s Today, Transmile was alleged to have overstated
its revenue by a total of RM522 million in financial years 2004, 2005 and 2006. In addition,
RM341 million in its property, plant and equipment account appear to have been fabricated as the
amount was little supported by documents. The company was also said to have made payments
2totaling RM189 million last year and this year, without any supporting payment vouchers.
(Abdullah, 2007)
These mini Enron’s cases will increase the investors’ risks and it would definitely affect the
investors’ confidence and trust in the audited accounts of Bursa Malaysia’s listed companies.
Investors would ask, how many similar Transmile case which was not discovered. This has lead
to angry investors and minority shareholders voicing and urging the authorities to take tough
action on those responsible and to examine the role of external auditors. (Chong, 2007). The loss
of confidence would be translated in our economy, as when investors loss trust, they will sell
their invested shares and market will react accordingly to the negative signaling effect. All
investors would be affected too, hence creating a vicious cycle.
The occurrence of mini-Enron’s cases could be due to failure to adhere to the best practices of
good corporate governance. Hence, putting the key players of corporate governance especially
the external auditors under scrutiny. In Malaysia, a company is compelled under Company’s Act
1967 to appoint an external auditor annually to audit its annual accounts. Thus, we can see here
that implicit in the mandatory appointment of external auditors by each company is the
recognition by the lawmakers that external auditors play a vital governance role to serve the
interests of the shareholders. (Ismail, 2007). But how true is this, is still subject to debate by the
general public especially after the occurrence of mini-Enrons.
Public question whether the corporate governance mechanism is actually in place amid the recent
negative incidents of audited financial statements. Transmile case which detected irregularities
3back to year 2004 actually worsening the doubt that the public had and wonder why the external
auditor gave out a clean opinion way back to financial year 2004, when in actual fact it is not,
thus deceiving the investors, especially the minority shareholders. According to
PricewaterhouseCoopers executive chairman Datuk Johan Raslan, what happened in the last few
months, showed inherent weaknesses in the existing financial system, especially in audit practice.
(Danny Yap, 2007). This is alarming as the investors, especially the minority shareholders who
depend on the audited financial statements to make investment decision and, having a doubt on
this main investment tool is not encouraging news. The occurrence of Mini-Enrons’ imply that
we Malaysian, seems to forget the lesson learned from the famous Enron Incident that contribute
to the collapse of a giant accounting firm, Arthur Andersen in year 2001. It looks like history is
about to repeat itself.
The introduction of the Public Companies Accounting Oversight Board (PCAOB) in October
2007 will warrant auditors to adhere to a new level of corporate governance. PCAOB
establishment was announced in the recent Budget 2008 by the Prime Minister YAB Dato’ Seri
Abdullah Ahmad Badawi and the establishment is for the purpose of improving corporate
governance under the auspices of the Securities Commission (SC) and the PCAOB will be
responsible for monitoring auditors of public companies to ensure that the quality and reliability
of audited financial statements are maintained. The setting up of the Public Companies
Accounting Oversight Board (PCAOB), which comes into effect on October 1, 2007, is a positive
move by the Government to ensure greater reliability of audited accounts, said
PricewaterhouseCoopers executive chairman Datuk Johan Raslan. The measures to improve
Corporate Governance came on the heels of several high-profile corporate scandals like
4Transmile Group Bhd's that had rattled investors and raised concerns over weaknesses in the
current system.
Players in the capital market also praised the Government for its speedy action to tighten
financial controls, sending a strong signal to those planning to defraud stakeholders that their
actions would not be tolerated. Others in the accounting fraternity also welcomed the setting up
of the PCAOB and other measures to protect investors. Studies have shown that better corporate
governance will have beneficial effects on the financial performance of companies such as higher
share prices or lower cost of capital, resulting in an overall better capital market. Companies
could be assured of the quality and independence of auditors, as there would a committed board
overseeing the function of auditors itself. Accounting firms would now require higher standards
of competencies and staff skills that would stick strictly to the rules (Danny Yap, 2007).
The mini-Enron’s cases and the setting up of PCAOB has indicated that the public and
government has lost its confidence and trust in the external auditing function. Hence, this study
attempt to show whether external auditors play a corporate governance role in Malaysia.
1.3 Problem Statement
As quoted in Accountants Today, 2007, July, p.6 “In 2002, then MIA President Datuk Abdul
Samad Haji Alias, in an article in Malaysian Business, stated that “mini-Enrons” were happening
in Malaysia all the time and to confirm with that, the media has been highlighting cases of
corporate reporting gone faulty”. The results are a spate of cases involving companies such as
5Transmile Group Bhd, Megan Media Holdings Bhd, Bumiputra-Commerce Holdings Bhd, and
Wimems Corp Bhd.
These minis- Enron’s cases have transformed investors into becoming, more careful and diligent
investors. Decision making information can be obtained from companies’ financial statements
and the quality of the information will be enhanced by the added credibility from having been
audited. (Pound, Willingham & Carmicheall, 1997). This credibility is questionable after the well
publicized big corporations like Enron and Worldcom collapsed shortly after an unqualified audit
report issued. This has resulted public to question whether or not external auditors are doing
their job properly and whether or not they actually play a role in maintaining healthy corporate
governance in Malaysia. The undetected irregularities by external auditors until much later
actually tarnished the reputation of the profession and the integrity of the auditing profession.
Corporate governance is defined as the system by which firms are controlled and directed
(Cadbury, 1992). Theoretical and empirical findings usually consider concentrations of
ownership and insider ownership as the main corporate governance concern (Ballesta & Garcia-
Meca, 2005). As ownership concentration increases to a level where an owner obtains effective
control of the firm, as is the case of East Asia, the nature of agency problems shifts away from
manager-shareholder conflicts to conflicts between the controlling owner and minority
shareholders (Scheifer & Vishny, 1997).
6In emerging market like Malaysia, concentration of shareholding, the domination of control by
family members or government institution is a common ownership structure. According to
Claessens, Djankov, and Lang (2000), one forth of the corporate sectors of Malaysia is controlled
by ten families. Fan and Wong (2001) and (2005) further concurred that in East Asia, agency
problem of listed companies in East Asia is closely related to their concentrated ownership
structure. Prior research studies consider ownership concentrations as one of the control
mechanisms in mitigating agency problem described earlier (Ballesta & Garcia-Meca, 2005).
However, this control creates another form of agency problem, the potential expropriation of
minority shareholders and other stakeholders by controlling shareholders (Guedhami & Pittman,
2006).
The concentrated ownership gives rise to conflicts of interest between the controlling owner and
minority shareholders and this agency problem is difficult to mitigate through conventional
corporate control mechanism such as board of directors and audit committees. According to Fan
and Wong, 2005, “to mitigate this agency problem, theory suggests that the controlling owners
may find ways to employ credible monitoring and bonding mechanisms to assure the minority
shareholders that their interests would be protected”. Thus, we examine whether external
independent auditors play this role in Malaysia Market.
In Malaysia, a company is compelled under Company’s Act 1967 to appoint an external auditor
annually to audit its annual accounts. Thus, we can see here that implicit in the mandatory
appointment of external auditors by each company is the recognition by the lawmakers that
7external auditors play a vital governance role to serve the interests of the shareholders. (Ismail,
2007). However, the spate of corporate failures, audit failures and financial scandals has led this
into a subject of debate among public.
The auditor’s responsibility is to express an opinion as to whether the set of accounts gives a true
and fair view of the company in accordance with the financial reporting framework and serve as
an assurance tools that the financial statements of public listed companies are stated at true and
fair view. The duties, scope, rights and responsibilities of the external auditors are spelt out in the
relevant sections on Audit and Accounts in the Companies Act, 1965. Investors rely on quality
financial information to assist them in making financial decisions and quality audit can enhance
the reliability of those financial statements. The attestation of the independent external auditors
via Auditors’ Report further improves the credibility of the financial information attested to it.
However, according to Fan and Wong (2001), whether or not East Asian external independent
auditors in practice fulfill the quality assurance role and hence mitigate the agency problem is
subjective and still open to debate among general public.
Agency problem arise because of conflicting goals and information asymmetry which creates
potential for opportunism (Jensen & Meckling, 1976). This study on whether the external
auditors play a corporate governance role is related to agency theory. Agency theory is built on
the premise that the interest of the principals (in this case, majority shareholder) and agents (in
this case, minority shareholder) are incompatible. In the absence of proper monitoring and control
mechanism, majority shareholders would have a higher degree of freedom to use the
8organisational resources for reasons not acceptable to minority shareholders. (Fan & Wong, 2001,
2005).
This study uses ownership concentrations as the common independent variable for each
dependent variables of auditor’s choice, audit fees, audit opinion and audit tenure. The theoretical
framework and hypotheses development of this study is primarily based on the agency theory as
the main concern of the corporate governance is to protect public’s interest. Thus, in this study,
we examine whether external independent auditors in Malaysia serve corporate governance
bonding mechanism role to alleviate the agency problems between the controlling owner and
minority shareholders which is proxy by the ownership structure of the company.
1.4 Gap in Literature
There are some gaps in previous literature that drive this study to be carried out to determine the
role of external auditors in corporate governance especially in the case of Malaysian public listed
company. Firstly, almost all empirical studies conducted in the past have utilized western
countries data. The research in the area of corporate governance was initiated in Asian countries
only after the Asian financial crisis when the governance structure was reformed. As such, by
focusing on data after the governance requirement been established, a clearer justification on the
role of external auditors in corporate governance can be drawn.
1.5 Research Objectives
The following are several objectives for doing this research:
9 To examine whether external independent auditors in Malaysia serve a corporate
governance bonding mechanism role in alleviating corporate governance concern, i.e. the
agency problems between the controlling owner and minority shareholders. Specifically this
study has few sub-objectives in investigating the corporate governance role of independent
external auditors in Malaysia.
(1) To examine the influence of agency conflicts between the controlling owner and
minority shareholders on company’s auditors’ choice of name brand (Big Four) external
auditors or the non Big Four external auditors
(2) To examine whether external auditors take into account firms’ agency conflicts
between the controlling owner and minority shareholders when making audit pricing
decisions
(3) To examine whether external auditors take into account firms’ agency conflicts
between the controlling owner and minority shareholders when making audit opinions
decisions
(4) To examine whether external auditors take into account firms’ agency conflicts
between the controlling owner and minority shareholders when making audit tenure
decisions
1.6 Research Questions
In order to achieve the above objectives, the proposed research attempts to answer the following
questions:
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a) Does company with high concentrated corporate ownership structure which is a proxy of
its agency conflicts is more likely to choose name brand big four auditors to address its
agency problem?
b) Does company with high concentrated corporate ownership structure which is a proxy of
its agency conflicts is more likely to be charged a higher audit fees by name brand big
four auditors as they charge a premium in response to agency problem?
c) Does low earning company with high concentrated corporate ownership structure which
is a proxy of its agency conflicts will more likely trigger a modified opinion?
d) Does low earning company with high concentrated corporate ownership structure which
is a proxy of its agency conflicts will more likely avoid long audit tenure?
1.7 Significance of Study
This study is important since there are increasing Mini-Enron’s cases in Malaysia .The
increasing calls from investors and Minority Shareholder Watchdog Group (MSWG) who wants
the authorities to take tough actions on those responsible is another factor to consider. MSWG
has urged the regulator to examine the role played by the external auditors and take speedy action
to bring those at fault to task. By conducting this study, we hope it can shed some light on
whether external auditors are actually at work in protecting the public interest.
1.7.1 Practical Approach
This study will contribute to the society in the following practical areas:
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 To serve as a reference for relevant parties as this work may be of interest to market
regulators such as PCAOB, institutional bodies and large audit firms given the concerns
over the regulation and quality of auditing services.
 To provide some background analysis on role of external auditing in Corporate
Governance in Malaysia and the result of this study proposal maybe able to restore the
faith public used to have on the external auditing profession in safeguarding the public
interest.
1.7.2 Academic Approach
This study will make contributions to the academic field as follows:
 To increase understanding on the current corporate governance mechanism by focusing
on external auditors’ role in company with high ownership concentrations.
 Contribute to Malaysian literature on the role of external auditing in Corporate
Governance in Malaysia.
1.8 Major Variables of Study
In order to share common understanding of the concepts and for better understanding of further
discussion, the following key terms’ definitions were referred specifically.
1.8.1 Ownership Structure as a Proxy for Agency Conflicts
Theoretical and empirical findings usually consider concentrations of ownership and insider
ownership as the main corporate governance mechanism (Ballesta & Garcia-Meca, 2005). As
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ownership concentration increases to a level where an owner obtains effective control of the firm,
as in the case of East Asia, the nature of agency problems shifts away from manager-shareholder
conflicts to conflicts between the controlling owner and minority shareholders (Scheifer &
Vishny, 1997). Agency problem of listed companies in East Asia is closely related to their
concentrated ownership structure in contrast with U.S. and U.K. organisations that are typically
diffusely owned. (Fan & Wong, 2005). In this study, we will be using ownership characteristics
of public listed companies in Malaysia to capture empirically the extents of their agency
problems.
1.8.2 Auditor’s Choice
In the context of this proposal, auditor choice is referring to the choice between name brand (Big
Four) external auditors in comparison with the non Big Four external auditors. The Big Four, is a
group of international accountancy and professional services firms that handles the vast majority
of audits for publicly traded companies as well as many private companies. It is known, that
generally big four auditors reputations are perceived to be more independent and provide better
quality than local auditors and the demand for their service should increase in response to the
client’s agency problem. (Fan & Wong, 2001, 2005)
1.8.3 Audit Fees
In the context of this proposal, audit fees is referring to how much the public listed companies in
Malaysia are paying to the independent external auditors in return for the services rendered. It is
mandatory disclosures required by Companies Act for companies to disclose in the statutory
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financial statements on how much the company are paying the external auditors. To further
examine the governance role of East Asian auditors, we investigate if external auditors take into
account firms’ agency conflicts when making audit pricing. If external auditors provide assurance
of quality through their superior reputations or if they exert efforts to mitigate agency conflicts,
these additional services would be reflected in the audit fee. Thus, we test if ceteris paribus
auditors charge a premium in response to agency problem.
1.8.4 Audit Opinion
In the context of this proposal, audit opinions are referring on what type of opinions are being
rendered by the external auditors. The auditor’s responsibility is to express an opinion as to
whether the set of accounts gives a true and fair view of the company in accordance with the
financial reporting framework. Basically, there are two types of opinions, clean and a modified
opinion. Modified opinions or an unclean opinion are not desirable because it may affect the
market share price and manager’s compensations. Thus, an unclean opinion does not benefit all
party in an organisation as it reflects in the company’s earnings. Whenever, there is a modified
opinion, automatically the reliability and validity of the annual report will be questionable which
reduce the confidence level of public external potential and existing shareholders, hence affecting
the share price. (Chow & Rice, 1982)
1.8.5 Audit Tenure
In the context of this proposal, audit tenure refers as the time length of how long the external
auditors have been servicing its client. Flint (1988) argued that independence will be lost if the
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auditor is involved in a personal relationship with the client, as this may influence their mental
attitude and opinion. One of such threats is lengthy tenure. He contends that lengthy tenure in
office may cause the auditors to develop “over-cosy relationships” as well as strong loyalty or
emotional relationships with their clients, which could reach a stage where auditor independence
is threatened. Lengthy tenure also results in “over familiarity” and consequently, the quality and
competence of auditors’ work may decline when they start to make unjustified assumptions
instead of objective evaluation of current evidence. (Flint, 1998).
1.9 Organization of the remaining chapters
This paper is organized in which the current chapter is the introduction to the field of study
proposed followed by an overview of its development. The chapter then defines the problem
statement, objectives of the research proposed and questions that is to be answered through the
research proposed. The chapter continues with definition of some key terms used in this proposal,
the significance of the research proposed and finally the outline of the entire proposal.
Chapter 2 reviews various work of the previous researches related to the topic of this proposal.
The chapter ends with the theoretical framework and hypotheses that will be used in the research
proposed. Chapter 3 discusses the research methodology proposed for the study. This includes
the research design, measures and statistical tests used for analysis of data. Chapter 4 presents the
empirical results and discussion. Finally, Chapter 5 summarises the conclusions, states the
limitations of the study and provides for future research.
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Chapter 2
LITERATURE REVIEW
2.1 Introduction
Claessens et al., (2000) examine the separation of ownership and control in nine East Asian
countries, and found that separation between ownership and management is rare due to
concentrated ownership in East Asia’s corporations. This can be interpreted as that, agency
problem arising from management and owner will not be that relevant in emerging economy like
Malaysia. However, even though agency problem arising from separation between ownership and
management has been mitigated due to concentrated ownership, this gives rise to another form of
agency conflicts between the majority and minority shareholders.
Concentration of corporate ownership creates agency conflicts between controlling owners and
minority shareholders especially in emerging markets like Malaysia. Conventional corporate
control mechanisms such as boards of directors, takeovers and audit committees are typically
weak in containing this agency problem. This literature review examines whether external
independent auditors could be employed as monitors and as bonding mechanisms to alleviate this
form of agency conflict and hence play a corporate governance role in protecting the public
interest. (Fan & Wong, 2001, 2005)
Hiring independent external auditors to assure information quality is not a new idea though.
Using a historical perspective, Watts and Zimmerman (1983) document that independent audits
were demanded since the days of English merchant guilds in the eleventh century to the time
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when audits were required by law in the twentieth century. Not only is an external audit valued
and thus demanded in the absence of law, there is evidence that firms with agency problems are
more likely to demand external audits
This literature review relates the corporate ownership structure with mandatory external audits in
the context of Malaysian market. We examine the link between auditor-related characteristics of
auditor’s choice, audit fees, audit opinion and audit tenure and ownership concentration as a
proxy of agency conflicts.
These factors as explained in Chapter One above provide quantifiable measures of whether
external auditors play corporate governance roles. For better understanding of the present study, a
search of previous literature has been undertaken. As such, this chapter was organized in the
manner to give an overview of underlying theory, literature review, theoretical framework and
the hypothesis development.
2.2 Corporate Governance
There have been many studies and research done in corporate governance in East Asia region,
most prominently from the gang of four i.e. Rafael La Porta, Florenzio Lopez-De-Silanes, Andrei
Shleifer and Robert Vishny. These scholars assembled powerful new empirical evidence on
corporate governance and introduced a new phase to corporate governance research.
17
In Malaysia, there is an annual Corporate Governance Survey (CG Survey) covering selected
public listed companies in collaboration with School of Business, Nottingham University.
Raising the standards of corporate governance of public listed companies in Malaysia played an
important role to the growth of a healthy capital market of the country. This is in line with the
Government’s effort to strengthen the corporate governance framework as announced in the
recent 2008 Budget in ensuring the integrity of the capital market and securing investors’
confidence. The role of gatekeepers of the capital market through the monitoring of corporate
governance standards should not be left to the regulators alone and all other market participants
must play their part. (Minority Shareholder Watchdog Group (MSGG), 2007)
The CG Survey reinforces the expectations that level of compliance with recommended corporate
governance principles and best practices is positively related with firm size, that is bigger
companies which arguably have the resources tend to exhibit higher level of compliance with
sound corporate governance principles and best practices. It also reveals that the requirements of
the Code have been generally well complied with and companies ought to strategies by
embracing those principles and best practices not already enjoyed by the Code as a means to
differentiate them against others in competing for lower cost of capital and international trade.
(MSGG, 2007)
A definition by the Finance Committee on Corporate Governance in Malaysia in the Report on
Corporate Governance (2001) stated that: “Corporate governance is the process and structure
used to direct and manage the business and affairs of the company towards enhancing business
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prosperity and corporate accountability with the ultimate objective of realizing long term
shareholder value, whilst taking account the interests of other stakeholders”.
This indicates that corporate governance is not only applied to the shareholders but the other
stakeholders as well. It affects the development and functions of capital markets and exerts a
strong influence on resource allocations due to its reductions in shareholder’s monitoring and
auditing costs. According to Zulkafli, Abdul Samad and Ismail (2005), the East Asian economies
collapsed in the second half of 1997 prompted the discussion on Corporate Governance and it is
through this period that greater concern and recognition of Corporate Governance to the public
and private sector in those countries were acknowledged.
The failure to regulate good governance affected the mobilizations of funds in effective ways as
corporate governance is an important element of achieving an allocative efficiency in which
scarce funds are being used in investments that generate the highest returns. (Zulkafli et al.,
2005). To concur with the abovementioned, Scheifer and Vishny (1997) mentioned that,
corporate governance mechanisms assure investor in organizations that they will receive adequate
returns in their investments. Thus, we can conclude that shareholders protection were inadequate
during the crisis and as such contributed to the destruction of the value of their investment.
There seems like a consensus that the element of poor governance could not be separated in
explaining the abovementioned crisis and as such, like other economies in East Asia, corporate
governance has been actively promoted to the Malaysian corporate sector in a period after the
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crisis. Since then, corporate governance measures have been taken to improve fairness,
transparency, accountability and responsibility in running the organizations (Zulkafli et al.,
2005).
This literature review will research whether the external auditors play a role in Corporate
Governance i.e. in alleviating corporate ownership concentrations, focusing on the Malaysian
context.
2.3 Agency Theory and corporate governance
Agency theory is widely used in the economic and finance studies. (Jensen & Meckling, 1976).
Separation between ownership and control of corporations characterizes the existence of a firm.
Berle and Means (1932) stated that agency problem arises due to this separation. In a corporation,
the shareholders are the principals and the managers are the agents working on behalf of the
principals. Agency theory assumed that interests of managers are not necessary in accordance
with the interest of shareholders. This results in agency problem (Short & Keasey, 1999; Wong &
Yek, 1991). The design of mechanism for effective corporate control to make managers act in the
best interest of shareholders has been a major concern in the areas of corporate governance (Allen
& Gale, 2001). Further research in agency theory attempts to design an appropriate framework
for such control. Prior studies consider ownership concentrations as one of the control
mechanisms in mitigating agency problem described earlier (Ballesta & Garcia-Meca, 2005).
However, this control creates another form of agency problem, the potential expropriation of
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minority shareholders and other stakeholders by controlling shareholders (Guedhami & Pittman,
2006).
2.4 Ownership Concentrations as a proxy for agency conflicts
We use the ownership characteristics of Malaysian Public Listed Companies to capture
empirically the extent of agency problems. Agency problem of listed companies in East Asia is
closely related to their concentrated ownership structure in contrast with United States (U.S.) and
United Kingdom (U.K.) organisations that are typically diffusely owned (Fan & Wong, 2001,
2005). This is evidence in the study performed by Krishnamurti, Sevic, A. and Sevic, J., (2006),
where almost 90% of public listed companies in Malaysia have a controlling shareholder. The
study also shows that the mean ownership by three largest shareholders is about 54% indicating
relatively high degree of ownership concentration. The mean voting rights of 34% for the typical
firm is much higher than the ownership of 28% indicating that the probability of expropriation.
Agency problems associated with the separation of ownership and control have been the subject
of “considerable” empirical research by Claessens et al., (2000); La Porta, Lopez-de- Silanes and
Shleifer, (1999); Fox and Walker, (1998); Johnson, Boone, Breach and Friedman, (2000).
With ownership concentrations, there is potential expropriation of minority shareholders and
other stakeholders by the controlling shareholders. As mentioned earlier on, this mitigates the
conventional agency problem of managerial expropriation however it creates another agency
problem between the majority and minority shareholders (Guedhami & Pittman, 2006). These
dominant shareholders usually exert full control over managers and frequently hold control
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power in excess of their cash flow rights, providing them with strong incentives to extract private
benefits at the expense of minority shareholders (La Porta et al., 1999). According to Scheifer
and Vishny (1997, p. 758), “large investors represent their own interests, which need not coincide
with the interests of other investors in the firm, or with the interests of employees and managers”.
Decisions made by controlling owners which are against the minority shareholders interest are
not easily contestable by internal and external control systems, i.e., boards of directors and
takeover markets, respectively and the controlling owners often will build up their control via
stock pyramids and cross shareholdings (Fan & Wong, 2001, 2005). This will result in the shares
of the organisations being traded at discount as external investors and ultimately the shareholders
(controlling and minority) would have to bear the costs (Claessens et al., forthcoming; La Porta et
al., 1999). The agency problem has also been attributed as a key factor that exacerbated the stock
market declines in East Asia during the 1997 financial crisis (Mitton, 2000; Johnson et al., 2000;
Lemmon & Lins, 2001)
The issue of ownership concentration has been a topic of research since Berle and Means (1932).
Further to Berle at. al., La Porta et al., (1999) found that ownership in countries other than United
States is more concentrated. Concentration of shareholding is a very common ownership pattern
in Malaysia. According to Bursa Malaysia data, Malaysia corporate sector had been highly
concentrate in term of ownership where about half of public listed companies had five
shareholders owning approximately 60.4 percent of the total equity in the corporate sector. In
Malaysia’s case, the main reasons of high level of ownership concentration are the prevalence
22
amount of state control and the significant amount of family control in public listed companies.
(Dogan & Smyth, 2002).
According to Dogan and Smyth (2002), in Malaysia, the main political parties – United Malays
National Organizations (UMNO), Malaysian Chinese Association (MCA) and the Malaysian
Indian Congress (MIC), have substantial business holdings. Claessens et al., (2000) using the
percentage of shares owned by the largest ten shareholders as a benchmark, reported that the state
controlled 17.8% and families controlled 67.2% of public listed companies in Malaysia (as cited
in Dogan & Smyth, 2002).
Theory shows that that entrepreneurs requiring external capital would have incentives to mitigate
their agency problems by introducing monitoring and/or bonding mechanisms (Fan & Wong,
2001, 2005). An organisation would prefer external financing if the expected benefits exceed the
expected gain of expropriating outside investors and may voluntarily employ reputation
intermediaries to assure outside investors about their credibility (Fan & Wong, 2001, 2005).
Several recent studies suggest that these ownership characteristics reasonably capture the agency
problem in East Asia. (Fan & Wong, 2005). Claessents et al., (2000) report that firm value is
sensitive to the largest shareholders cash flow rights and voting rights, consistent with the
existence of agency problem. Fan and Wong (2002) report that credibility of East Asian firms’
accounting information decreases with agency conflicts, as captured by the firms’ ownership
structures.
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Consistent with Claessens et al., (2000), we will use the percentage of shares owned by the ten
largest shareholder of a firm as a proxy for the degree of control. The higher the voting rights of
the largest shareholder, the more entrenched is his or her position to expropriate wealth from
minority shareholders.
In this paper, we investigate whether independent external auditors can serve a corporate
governance role by testifying the quality of accounting information in view of agency problems
embedded in the highly concentrated ownership of the companies. We will test whether, the
appointment of quality auditors serves as an assurance to the investors that the companies’
financial disclosures would be accurate and truthful. The assurance is credible because the
auditors, with their reputation at stake, will closely scrutinize their clients’ books and truthfully
disclose their finding
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2.5 Role of External Auditors in Corporate Governance
External auditor is an agent for shareholders and, to a certain extent, also for other stakeholders
based on the examinations of the corporate governance promulgations and reports from different
interest groups (Holm & Laursen, 2007).
Evidence in a United Nations report, Rahman (1999) calls into question if East Asian external
auditors actually serve as monitors. The report queries why many external auditors had issued
clean auditing opinions to clients that later went bankrupt within a few months after the
completion of the audits at the Asian Financial Crisis. The question whether or not Malaysian
auditors in practice fulfill the quality assurance role and hence reduce the agency problem has
been a subject of debate, moreover following the Transmile case which was discussed in detail in
Chapter 1. If we were to compare to U.S and U.K external audit environment, external auditors in
East Asia potentially have a stronger governance role because of weaker legal system in
protecting the investors and this is consistent with the fact that the market for external auditors in
East Asia is more encouraging (Fan & Wong, 2001, 2005). Generally, in the event of financial
reporting failure, investors value legal institutions that discipline auditors. (Guedhami & Pittman,
2006).
It seems like Malaysian government is agreeing with Guedhami and Pittman (2006) with the
setting up of the Public Companies Accounting Oversight Board (PCAOB) on October 1, 2007.
PCAOB is a board responsible for monitoring auditors of public companies to ensure that the
quality and reliability of audited financial statements are maintained
